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Cajole and Control: The Law of Managing Education in a Globalised World 
David Mangan* 
 
Improvement of publicly-funded education has long been part of governments’ more pressing 
mandates. With globalisation and recent economic issues, the pressure has intensified. This 
article canvasses the different legislative tactics employed in England to improve education 
delivery while reducing its cost. Two methods have been used in particular, control and 
cajole: successive governments have adopted a strategy of controlling the cost of education 
and cajoling teachers’ to improve student achievement. A similar sequence of events arising in 
both England and Canada are canvassed in order to highlight the distinct new course taken by 
the former in 2010. This paper presents examples of legislative management of education at a 
time that governments around the world are facing significant demands to reduce public 
expenditure while simultaneously increasing student achievement (as a way of preparing for 
the future).  
 
I. Introduction 
In many jurisdictions, education has been an area of persistent attention because it is viewed 
as the means for equipping a country for the future. There has been constant pressure placed 
on public systems of education to equip future generations for a diverse range of challenges. 
And yet, the means by which this goal may be achieved are numerous. The only constant is 
public demand for progressive, cost-efficient and effective education. For a global audience, 
the management of education1 in England is instructive. A point of departure arose in 2010 as 
the English Government embarked on a remarkable shift in the management of public 
education.  
 
Since the Second World War, English education has become increasingly regulated by the 
national government. Two concerns have dominated over the same period: rising costs and 
perceived deficiencies in teachers’ labours. In the 1970s efforts to limit expenditure and to 
ameliorate the substantive aspects of teaching emerged as dominant topics. Events in the 
latter part of the 1970s set the parameters for discussion to which Margaret Thatcher2 
responded in the 1980s. Her monumental reforms laid the groundwork for the next thirty 
years of centralised education governance. After her departure from office, centralisation of 
control over education was intensified, most especially under the Labour Government of Tony 
Blair. During his administration, there were subtle hints of incremental disengagement from a 
day-to-day form of control. This theme quickly came to the fore with the election of the 
Coalition Government in 2010. It took the bold step of actively promoting academies (much 
more than previous governments) as well as free schools, both of which epitomise a 
decentralised system of education governance. The shift suggests that central control had 
failed. Downloading responsibility for schooling to the local community offered another 
means of constraining expenditure and cajoling teachers’ renewed efforts.  
 
                                                 
*
 My thanks to Tonia Novitz, Heikki Pihlajamäki and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.     
1
 The term management as opposed to regulation is employed here because successive governments have used 
the law as a means of micro-managing education whereas to regulate education would suggest a degree of 
autonomy which school personnel (as the primary workers in this industry) do not enjoy. 
2
 Prime Ministers’ names and their political parties are used as identifiers only and not as a means of political 
commentary. 
2 
 
Comparison with Canada offers instructive symmetry. In both jurisdictions, education has 
been an area of significant unrest and Conservative governments have presided over 
ambitious legislative changes. The contrast emerges in more recent times as the respective 
governments engaged in the reform process and where the English government has taken a 
bold new direction.  
 
This paper critically situates the legislative reforms of education employed in England3 since 
the 1980s to effect the goal of a cost effective, high achieving education system. A 
chronological order of reforms is employed so as to emphasise the 2010 reforms implemented 
by the Coalition Government which mark a point of departure from preceding ideas. Tracing 
English history of the influence of the dual focus on teachers’ work and restricting 
expenditure, it is contended that the 2010 reforms initiated a new discussion filled with 
challenging decisions. The decentralised focus brings a procedural change which, like any 
new system, presents some difficulties such as reliance on specialisation in subject matters 
which raises questions regarding comprehensive student preparation for a globalised world. 
While the aims may be laudable, implementation of the reforms leaves much in question, 
thereby ensuring the continuation of control and cajole as the underpinning of education 
management.  
 
 
II. Globalisation and Education 
An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) occasional paper 
situates the present challenges for governments with regards to the management of education. 
The authors identified globalisation as a force prompting change in the labour market. While 
the comments were couched in unemployment rates among the OECD countries, the authors 
characterised the time as one of ‘innovation, experimentation and evaluation in order to find 
out what works and why.’4 Mere employment being itself insufficient, competitiveness has 
emerged as an aspiration for national governments with emphasis placed on education. The 
economic crisis of the early 21st century has increased expectations of publicly funded 
education: ‘The case for education’s role in the recovery will require a demonstration that 
education is capable of transforming itself to improve outcomes and value for money.’5 
Within this framework of performance legitimacy,6 governments strive to demonstrate 
effective management of public services.  
 
Education has become a bedrock for future national achievement7 in a globalised world. 
Globalisation has changed the ‘power relations between the national and transnational 
                                                 
3
 The focus will be on England as increasingly education has become a matter of more territorial concern in the 
United Kingdom. 
4
  OECD Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, ‘Key Employment Policy 
Challenges Faced by OECD Countries’, (1998) Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers No.31, 
[34].   
5
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Education at a Glance 2009 (Paris: OECD, 2009), 
6. 
6
 Where performance legitimacy is ‘the ability of any political entity to deliver policy goals [and] [a]ttention is 
devoted both to the choice of policy priorities and their realisation’: T. Novitz & P. Syrpis, ‘Assessing legitimate 
structures for the making of transnational labour law: the durability of corporation’ (2006) 35 Industrial Law 
Journal 367-394, 369 
7
 One may recall then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s famous statement that his focus was ‘education, education, 
education’.  
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levels’.8 To that point, OECD assessments in education are being relied upon in order to rank 
national performance of students, and therefore the success of education systems in preparing 
for future challenges. Many countries (including the UK and Canada) are participating in the 
OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment. PISA measures achievement in 
education amongst volunteering countries. More specifically, it assesses the extent to which 
fifteen year old students ‘near the end of compulsory education have acquired key knowledge 
and skills that are essential for full participation in modern societies.’9 As with any report of 
its kind, there are criticisms of PISA.10 Still, it appears to be used as an important indicator in 
England. In response to PISA 2012, Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove stated in 
Parliament – ‘The programme of reform that we have set out draws on what happens in the 
best school systems – identified today by the OECD…’.11  
 
With globalisation and comparisons such as PISA, nation states have been placed in a 
competitive scenario. Globalisation has made skilled human resources a necessity in each 
country for the purpose of attracting foreign investment and international production: it 
‘rewards countries that have the human resources to exploit it, but also penalises those that do 
not.’12 The increased importance of PISA is remarkable, especially for England, because it 
represents a form of standardized assessment for an area which is being decentralised. The 
OECD report entitled PISA 2012 Results (which focused on mathematics with minor areas of 
assessment being reading, science and problem-solving)13 identified a growing trend dating 
back to the 1980s which saw many governments grant ‘individual schools increasing 
authority to make autonomous decisions on curricula and resource allocation on the premise 
that individual schools are good judges of their students’ learning needs and of the most 
effective use of resources.’14 The UK was identified as one jurisdiction where school 
autonomy was found to be amongst the highest.15 The national apparatus is being abandoned 
in favour of a local response to education needs. The rapid evolution of education 
management in England, with growing involvement of parents, has seemingly made 
localisation of education inevitable. The added consideration is the financial implications of 
such a move where financial advantages for national expenditure may be realised. PISA 
shows that comparisons are being made on a country-wide level (instead of local); thereby 
raising the query of how a fragmented education system may fair against more structured 
competitors.  
 
IV. The evolution of the post-World War II centralised system to 1979 
The Education Act 194416 has been called the most important piece of legislation during the 
Second World War.17 The lowest level of centralised control over teachers’ work was in the 
                                                 
8
 A.W. Little & A. Green, ‘Successful globalization, education and sustainable development’ (2009) 29 
International Journal of Educational Development 166-174, 167. 
9
 PISA, ‘About PISA’ http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa (last accessed 27 February 2014). 
10
 See for example, The Economist ‘How accurate are school league-tables?’ (online version of 5th December 
2013; last accessed: 27th February 2014) and ‘Finn-ished’ (print edition of 7th December 2013).  
11
 HC Deb 2 December 2013 Col.784. 
12
 F. Stewart, ‘Globalisation and Education’ (1996) 16 International Journal of Educational Development 327-
333 [Stewart], 331. 
13
 OECD, PISA 2012 Results: What Makes Schools Successful? Resources, Policies and Practices (Volume IV) 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013) [PISA 2012] 
14
 PISA 2012, 129. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Repealed by the Education Act 1996. 
17
 C. Chitty, Education Policy in Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) [Chitty], 18. 
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years immediately following World War II.18 The systemic significance of the Act was the 
establishment of a linear progression for students from primary through secondary school 
which lasts today. The Education system as of 1944 was one of central oversight.19 While 
concerns were expressed regarding the breadth of the Secretary of State’s authority, the Act 
was passed without amendment to that power. This control was aimed at local authorities that 
did not live up to standard.20  
 
The period immediately after World War II witnessed greater local control over education as 
compared to the years from 1980 onwards. Notably, the government did not exercise its 
authority to intercede during the earlier era.21 Teachers were left to do their work without 
significant prescription. One explanation as to why government refrained from injecting itself 
into the administration of education was that the factors influencing school curricula were 
better engaged at the local level.22  
 
Determining teachers’ pay had been left to the Burnham Committee, since 1919, which 
provided a recommendation as to remuneration. Prior to 1944, these proposals were 
‘generally accepted’,23 but Local Authorities were not mandated to follow them. Section 89 of 
the Education Act 1944 required all Local Authorities to pay the Burnham salary once the 
Secretary of State had approved of the Committee’s recommendations. This arrangement 
continued until its elimination in the late 1980s. Burnham’s end had much to do with 
expenditure;24 concern for which dated back to the 1960s when wage limits were imposed. 
For teachers, the limits were effected by the Remuneration of Teachers Act 196525 which 
introduced a framework change by providing flexibility regarding the outcome of pay 
recommendations.26 As the years progressed, this intervention would not be the last. In the 
latter half of the 20th century, a new perspective was developing. As one example, Lord 
Plowden’s 1967 report called for greater parental participation including better interaction 
between parents and school personnel and the opportunity for parents to choose schools.27 He 
also recommended parents contribute financially to school activities. From the mid-1960s 
until the mid-1980s concerns grew as different means of restraining expenditure (with wages 
a focus) were attempted. Slowly, a ‘twenty year crisis between 1965 and 1985’ arose with 
attacks on remuneration premised on a fear of losing control of wages.28 
 
                                                 
18
 It has been contended that teachers did not take full advantage of this opportunity: D. Lawton, The Politics of 
School Curriculum (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980), 22.  
19
 Education Act 1944, section 1. 
20
 H.C. Dent, The Education Act, 1944: Provisions, Regulations, Circulars, Later Act 12th edn. (London: 
University of London Press Ltd., 1968) [Dent], 5. 
21N. Harris, Education, Law and Diversity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) [Harris], 91. 
22Chitty, 115. 
23
 Dent, 26. 
24
 Incomes policies has been the generic term used. It was defined by Lord Wedderburn as ‘attempts by law, 
sometimes soft-law or even government persuasion (often a mixture of the three) to intervene directly on wage 
bargaining “in the public interest”’: Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom and Frontiers of Labour Law’ in Labour Law 
and Freedom: Further Essays in Labour Law (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), 350-437, 359. 
25
 Repealed by the Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act 1987. 
26
 Section 4(2) granted Parliament the power to disregard an arbitrator’s ruling based on ‘national economic 
circumstances.’ Section 2(5)(b) allowed the Secretary of State to amend Committee conclusions if ‘it appears to 
the Secretary of State that effect could more conveniently be given to those recommendations by amending the 
scales and other provisions set out in the document.’ 
27
 Lord Plowden, Children and Their Primary Schools (London: HMSO, 1967). 
28
 M. Ironside & R. Seifert, Industrial Relations in Schools (London: Routledge, 1995) [Ironside & Seifert], 25. 
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In the mid-1970s, the Labour Government, trying to include trade unions in the process of 
wage constraints, vested the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) with the power of enforcing 
wage restraint. The ‘Social Contract’ eventually failed to maintain the TUC’s support. At its 
1977 Congress, the TUC voted to return to free collective bargaining. The following two 
years brought the ‘winter of discontent’ strikes during which time unions of workers waged 
massive actions seeking higher pay.   
 
The substantive issue of what was being taught in schools emerged most prominently 
between 1973 and 1975 when public attention focused on William Tyndale Junior School in 
North London. The teaching methods of its staff were alleged to have diminished the 
importance of reading, writing and arithmetic.29 A report concluded in 1976 that there were 
some teachers on staff who had grossly mismanaged the curriculum.30 The scandal gave rise 
to considerable scrutiny of teaching methods. Long term, this incident provided a useful 
example as to why future governments prescribed, with increasing detail, teachers’ work. The 
emerging view was that government intervention was required. Into this breach stepped the 
Margaret Thatcher-led Conservative Party – earning an election victory in 1979. By that 
time, there was fear the failure of schools had seeped into industry and would disrupt the 
economy as well. 
 
(i) The great debate 
The framework for the monumental reforms of the 1980s has been traced to Labour Prime 
Minister James Callaghan (particularly his ‘Great Debate’ speech at Ruskin College, Oxford, 
in 1976) who made the following pronouncement:31 
I take it that no one claims exclusive rights in this field. Public interest is strong and legitimate 
and will be satisfied. We spend £6 billion a year on education. So there will be discussion . . . 
parents, teachers, learned and professional bodies, representatives of higher education and both 
sides of industry, together with the Government, all have an important part to play in 
formulating and expressing the purpose of education and the standards that we need.32 
 
The Callaghan Government’s Green Paper Education in Schools: A Consultative Document33 
carried on from this 1976 pronouncement: ‘Teachers lacked adequate professional skills.’ 
These assessments were part of a call to teachers for change, to strive for excellence. They 
also constituted a warning: those who failed to adapt to changing times were unwelcome 
hindrances to this progressive movement. Anticipating the following pages, Callaghan’s 
elaboration on the need for standards and accountability in his 1976 speech planted a seed 
which the Conservative Party (lead by Margaret Thatcher) cultivated and let grow. Labour 
                                                 
29
 Chitty, 37. 
30
 R. Auld. William Tyndale Junior and Infants Schools Public Inquiry: A Report of the Inner London Education 
Authority by Robin Auld, QC (London: ILEA, 1976). 
31
 Chitty, 57; R. Phillips, ‘Education, the state and the politics of reform: the historical context, 1976-2001’ in R. 
Phillips & J. Furlong eds. Education, Reform and the State: Twenty-Give Years of Politics, Policy and Practice 
(Routledge: Abingdon 2001), 12-27 [Phillips]; G. McCulloch, ‘The reinvention of teacher professionalism’ in R. 
Phillips & J. Furlong eds. Education, Reform and the State: Twenty-Give Years of Politics, Policy and Practice 
(Routledge: Abingdon 2001), 103 -117. 
32
 J. Callaghan, ‘Towards a national debate’ (16 October 1976) reprinted in The Guardian 15 October 2001 
[Callaghan]. 
33
 Department of Education and Science, Education in Schools: A Consultative Document (London: HMSO, 
1977) [Education in Schools], 2, 33. 
6 
 
(under Tony Blair) continued this effort.34 Looking back, Callaghan’s comments were 
precedent-setting.   
 
III. Thatcher’s dominant role in education   
Unsurprisingly, the Thatcher (and to a lesser extent her immediate Conservative party 
successor as Prime Minister John Major) government in English politics remains a landmark 
period in English education reform.35 The aims of the reforms were the quality and cost of 
education provided by teachers. Thatcher’s term in office defined education for the next 
thirty years and it was the key reforms of this period which are highlighted below for their 
formative importance in education management. In their entirety, Thatcher’s changes 
revealed both a distrust of teachers as well as an affinity for creating pressure points in order 
to cajole substantive improvements in teacher outputs. Furthermore, teachers’ roles were 
greatly downplayed insofar as significant reforms to education were implemented without 
their input.  
 
(i) Reform through teachers’ work  
In the 1980s, the Thatcher government took a more focused role in the management of 
education. Control and cajole were demonstrated by a mixture of consolidation of control in 
central government. They were also coupled with a decentralised notion of choice which 
replicated efforts at cajoling improved student results. Situating of central management over 
education in the government’s hands was the most direct means of addressing public sector 
expenditure concerns.36 It also gave the government the opportunity to engage further with 
teachers’ work. For example, the national curriculum standardised what was taught in schools 
across the jurisdiction.37 Teachers were shut out of this plan and other involvement in 
Government decision-making in the 1980s.38 The Thatcher government’s resolve was firm: it 
intended to follow a path of reform regardless of opposition from personnel in the area. In 
relation to cajoling better efforts, the Education Act 1980 re-energised the idea of parental 
choice.39 As well, the publication of schools’ performance data which were linked with 
accountability40 sent an unequivocal message – teachers required motivation to achieve better 
results and this would be done by establishing a competitive market for schooling.  
 
Unsurprisingly due to the scale of the reforms, tensions intensified through the early 1980s 
and industrial action drew attention to teachers’ contractual obligations.41  When discord was 
                                                 
34
 Blair referred to Callaghan’s urging a national curriculum in 1976 in his Foreword to Department for 
Education and Skills, Higher Standards, Better Schools for All: More Choice for Parents and Pupils Cm.6677 
(London: TSO, 2005), 1. 
35
 It is oft-cited as an instance of neoliberalism: See for example, D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
36
 Phillips, 17. 
37
 It may be asserted that implementing national curricula brought England in line with other countries. The 
point here, however, is the context in which it arose – in a time of consolidation of powers over education and 
without teacher input.  
38
 As Davies and Freedland noted, unions were during this time: P. Davies & M. Freedland, Labour Legislation 
and Public Policy (Oxford: OUP, 1993) [Davies & Freedland (1993)], chapter 9. 
39
 In the late 1970s, the Taylor Committee called for greater involvement by parents in the school system 
because of their status as important stakeholders: T. Taylor (Chair), A New Partnership for Our Schools 
(London: HMSO, 1977), 3.8. 
40
 ‘If schools are responsive to parents, they will become accountable to the surrounding area’: Dr. Rhodes 
Boyson, HC Deb 29 January 1981 vol. 997, 1161. 
41
 S. Fredman & G. Morris, ‘The Teachers’ Lesson: Collective Bargaining and the Courts’ (1987) 16 Industrial 
Law Journal 215-226, 217. 
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voiced through litigation, the courts’ response reinforced the government’s own efforts. Three 
examples follow.42 The court in Metropolitan Borough of Solihull v. NUT43 brought an end to 
a lunch time supervision dispute (that lunchtime supervision was not voluntary work) by 
relying on a view of teachers as professional employees. In Royle v. Trafford B.C.,44 the 
Council sought to reduce costs by lowering the numbers of teachers and correspondingly 
raising the number of students in each class. Following the National Association of 
Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers’ (NASUWT) call for industrial action, Royle 
refused to teach the five extra pupils assigned to him, but continued on with his other duties 
(teaching the remainder of the class as well as taking on extracurricular activities). Trafford 
refused to pay him any salary for the six months of industrial action. The Court agreed with 
the Council’s contention that Royle broke his contract; though there is little reasoning on the 
point.45 Sim v. Rotherham B.C.46 ruled on the question of whether or not teachers were 
expected to supervise the classes of absent colleagues. Scott J. classed teachers’ contracts as 
those of professionals: agreements which could not possibly set out the entirety of the duties 
between the parties because the work itself defied explicit enumeration. In their totality, these 
decisions modified teachers’ contracted obligations in a manner which produced cost savings. 
Moreover, these rulings interpreted unclassified work, which teachers had thought was 
undertaken as a matter of goodwill, as a contractual obligation. It should be noted that if these 
decisions had been in favour of the teachers’ unions, the story could have been quite different.  
 
The next phase altered how teachers’ work was negotiated. In 1987 the government 
circumvented collective bargaining; a move which further centralised control of education in 
the hands of the national government and one in keeping with Thatcher’s economics-
dominated strategy.47 The Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act 198748 eliminated teachers’ 
collective bargaining and the Burnham Committee.49 The authority vested in the Secretary of 
State for Education was extensive.50 The work of teachers was more explicitly defined and 
the courts were at the ready to assist with any contractual ambiguities. And yet, this was not 
the end of the changes.   
 
Not since 1944 had there been such massive, one-time reform of schools in the country as 
there was with the passage of the Education Reform Act 1988. The creation of a national 
curriculum remains one of the most notable components of the Act and a further step in the 
process of centralised management of education. The programme ‘centred around new 
financial systems and structures which [were] founded in limiting resources and stimulating 
managerial controls.’51 Most telling was that the Act allowed the Secretary of State to make 
                                                 
42
 For a discussion of professional work, see D. Mangan, ‘The Curiosity of Professional Status’ (2014) Journal 
of Professional Negligence (forthcoming). 
43
 [1985] I.R.L.R. 211 [Solihull]. 
44
 [1984] I.R.L.R. 184 [Royle]. 
45
 Since the Council accepted the teaching of 31 students, they could reduce Royle’s pay by 5/36 of his salary for 
that period. 
46
 [1986] I.R.L.R. 391 [Sim]. 
47Davies & Freedland (1993), 9.1. 
48Repealed 6 March 1992 by the Education (Schools) Act 1992. 
49To replace the former process, the Act created the Interim Advisory Committee on School Teachers’ Pay and 
Conditions (IAC) (Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act 1987, s.2) which lasted until 1991 when the School 
Teachers Pay and Conditions Act 1991 established its still existing successor the School Teachers Review Body 
(STRB) (Education Act 2002, c.32, s119(1)(b)). 
50
 Section 3(7) of the Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act 1987 typifies this power: the Secretary may have 
rendered an order ‘he [thought] fit with respect to the remuneration and other conditions of employment.’ 
51
 Ironside & Seifert, 2 
8 
 
many of the decisions one would expect education personnel to make.52 Legislation identified 
core and foundation courses of study.53 To ensure that the statute was followed, the National 
Curriculum Council (NCC) and the School Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC) 
were established.54 These were in addition to s 49 of the Education Act (No.2) 198655 which 
mandated the appraisal of teachers. Chapter IV of the 1988 Act created a process by which 
parents of children in primary and secondary schools (with an enrolment in excess of 300)56 
could opt out of Local Education Authority oversight and form ‘grant maintained’ schools. As 
of 1990, forty-four schools had been granted this status.57 Competition within education for 
the purposes of raising standards58 -- with the expectation that the education system would be 
much more responsive to parents59 -- had been entrenched. 
 
Moving briefly to the Major era, the Education (Schools) Act 1992 marked a subtle, initial 
move away from hands-on regulation by government. Though his time in office did not 
engage with education on the same scale as his immediate predecessor,60 Major’s ideas 
anticipated those held by the Coalition Government, namely that education is a matter best 
addressed locally61 as well as repeating the need for parental choice.62 Notably for the present 
work, the Act established the first version of the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) 
which has become the regulatory body for quality assurance in schools (a role discussed 
further below in relation to the reforms of 2010). Within the context of the present discussion, 
though, Ofsted came in between government and the day-to-day operations of education. The 
Chief Inspector’s functions included information gathering and dissemination.63 The added 
layer of regulation distanced government from the day-to-day management of the portfolio. 
Government was shifting its role from direct supervisor to overseer while maintaining its 
focus on expenditure and teachers’ work. This method of education management would be 
seen briefly in the then imminent Labour era but is quite prominent in Coalition plans. 
 
The questions which then Prime Minister Callaghan posed in the late 1970s regarding the 
quality of teachers’ work became larger concerns under Thatcher. The legislative answer was 
to outline the work of teachers in remarkable detail – from the hours of work to what is 
taught. The common law assisted in the endeavour and perhaps this was where the most 
potent aspect arose. The courts read teachers’ employment contracts as those of professionals 
and yet there was a different meaning to this term. In the 1980s decisions, professionals’ 
employment contracts were incapable of exhaustively outlining all the duties of this cadre. 
And so, non-delineated duties were found to be mandatory; thereby granting significant 
leeway in favour of the government’s reforms and the consequent increase in expectations of 
teachers. The combined effect of government reforms which betrayed distrust of teachers 
                                                 
52
 For example student achievement targets and the content of studies: s4(1),(2).  
53
 Education Reform Act 1988, s3(1),(2). 
54
 Education Reform Act 1988, Schedule II. 
55
 Repealed by the Education Act 2002. 
56
 Education Reform Act 1988, s52(6). 
57
 N. Rao, Educational Change and Local Government: The Impact of the Educational Reform Act (York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 1990) [Rao], 15. 
58
 Rao, 15. 
59
 This would appear to be the aim as identified in Education Reform Act: Local Management in Schools, 
Circular 7/88. 
60
 Clearly demonstrated by consistently situating plans within the continuum of Thatcher reforms in Choice and 
Diversity: A New Framework for Schools (London: HMSO, 1992) (Cm 2021) [Choice and Diversity]. 
61
 Ibid, 3-4. 
62
 ‘Parents know best the needs of their children – certainly better than educational theorists or administrators, 
better even than our mostly excellent teachers’: Ibid, 2. 
63
 Section 2(1) of the Education (Schools) Act 1992. 
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coupled with courts’ rendering of decisions which (to teachers) turned matters of goodwill 
into professional work obligations demoralised. Castigating teachers was hardly the 
groundwork for positive change. It may be said that education needed a radical change and 
this certainly occurred. However, it seems to have disenfranchised education personnel; 
leaving the teacher workforce wary of future initiatives 
 
V. Regulation, regulation, regulation  
Labour (through its leader Tony Blair) embodied a sentiment of hope when it was elected to 
office in 1997. The public had identified a need for change and voiced that opinion through 
suffrage. The new government, it may be said, had the potential to lift the malaise which hung 
over teachers since the 1980s. In contrast to the hope it presented, one critic has characterised 
Labour’s ‘Third Way’ as neoliberalism ‘by stealth’.64  
 
The present section will outline elements of continuity between the Thatcher and Blair 
periods but will also highlight a noteworthy difference between these governments. Unlike 
the predecessor Conservative Governments, Labour focussed almost exclusively on improved 
student results and using teachers as the vehicle for this goal. Moreover, its strategy was to 
manage teachers’ work in remarkable detail. Arguably this did nothing to reinvigorate teacher 
ranks and to abate continued criticism of teachers. The law and policy brought about during 
this period was premised on precipitating positive social change by better equipping citizens 
for the challenge of globalisation. Under this ethos, Blair ended up trying to bring 
government and teachers together with some level of success. 
 
(i) The challenge of change 
A new form of the Labour Party entered office in 1997: ‘the state was to act more as a catalyst 
and an enabler, ensuring the necessary conditions around an agreed minimum framework of 
legal rules and regulations within which private enterprise could grow and flourish.’65 With 
public sector unions, Blair’s attitude appeared to be similar to that of Thatcher: ‘he believed 
[that they] were stubbornly resisting his plans to privatise central and local government 
activities because they wanted to defend public-sector inefficiencies and their restrictive 
labour practices.’66 In education, it was clear that the status quo of public sector education 
would not suffice for the Government.67  
 
The stakes seemed to be too important to leave to teachers. Prime Minister Blair made 
education the benchmark for judging his leadership. He viewed education as a panacea for 
England’s challenges: ‘Teaching is a profession – one of the most important professions for 
the future success and well-being of our country’.68 Aims went beyond the regulation of 
education workplaces to include ‘labour market regulation in the interests of full employment 
and inclusion of the population within the active workforce.’69   
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One of Labour’s earlier policy papers, Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change,70 set an 
agenda with which the government expected teachers’ cooperation. Recalling Callaghan’s 
imperative, Challenge of Change was unequivocal as to the role of teachers in the education 
reform agenda: ‘All this demands a new professionalism among teachers. The time has long 
gone when isolated, unaccountable professionals made curriculum and pedagogical decisions 
alone, without reference to the outside world.’71 Reinforcing the point in 1999, a follow-up 
document to Challenge of Change contained this assertion: ‘we can only realise the full 
potential of our schools if we recruit and motivate teachers and other staff with the ambition, 
incentives, training and support.’72 The imperative voice detectable throughout told teachers 
they were part of a profession which will follow the directions given to it by government 
because to do otherwise would be out-of-step with modern education. 
 
Cajole dominated over financial restraint in Labour’s mandate. In introducing performance 
pay (in 2000),73 the Government assumed that teachers would raise their efforts for higher 
pay. Competition was key but distinct from the Thatcher era; this form of competition was 
amongst colleagues. Willing to end the long period of pay restraint initiated in 1993,74 the 
government believed that incentive-based pay would deal with the issues of enhancing 
performance,75 recruitment and retention.76 Performance pay, however, was ineffective77 as a 
means of enhancing results for three reasons: teachers were not motivated by greater pay; as 
with other measures attempting the same aim, there were difficulties linking student 
achievement with objective criteria; and performance pay pushed funding beyond anticipated 
levels. 
 
Since the report of the Public Services Productivity Panel in 2000,78 it had been known that a 
performance-based system of pay for public sector employees posed its own challenges. The 
uniqueness of public sector employment raised difficulties in measuring performance, 
especially where objectives were diffuse.79 The idea of serving a public need often reduced 
financial drive amongst workers.80 The performance pay system in education was initiated 
primarily as a quality-assurance mechanism. The threshold for achieving this monetary 
reward was a combination of teacher knowledge, performance as well as pupil success. 
Performance pay was not warmly received.81 Fervent lobbying efforts by headteachers’ and 
teachers’ associations resulted in a number of key changes such as easing the path of 
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individuals attempting to move up the pay spine as well as tempering the connection between 
student achievement and performance pay.82 The upper pay scale (UPS) which was supposed 
to incentivise ended up being pay progression.83 As a result, teachers’ scepticism decreased 
gradually.84 
 
The original plan contained significant flaws (for example not establishing challenging 
criteria for the reward) resulting in failure to achieve the desired goal of rewarding 
performance. Furthermore, performance pay strained school budgets.85 By 2007, over half of 
full time teachers were at the UPS level and 35% of secondary school teachers were at the 
highest UPS level (3).86 As well, it took less time to reach top rate as the salary scale was 
reduced to six points from nine. As a motivational tool, performance pay failed with teachers. 
A 2004 study of the impact of performance pay concluded that there was no way to measure 
improvement in student performance.87 The perception was that teachers received a pay raise 
without necessarily meeting stated goals. Still, there was an unexpected positive outcome: the 
new system helped to reconcile teachers’ objectives in the classroom with those of the school 
as a whole (and by extension government aims).88 These results simultaneously challenged 
and verified elements of Makinson’s assumptions regarding performance pay,89 thereby 
reinforcing the difficulties of education as a portfolio for reform. Cajoling improved student 
achievement was going to require a new strategy. 
 
(ii) Cajoling through discourse 
Despite similarities, Blair’s leadership on education should not be casually associated with 
that of Thatcher. As noted, both Blair and Thatcher followed Callaghan’s lead. In his second 
mandate, Blair altered his tactic and attempted directed dialogue. 
 
Schools Achieving Success90 maintained the focus on the role of teachers: ‘The quality of 
teaching and learning in the classroom is key to raising standards. We want to ensure high 
national standards throughout the system, capable of being interpreted flexibly to meet the 
needs of all pupils.’91 Though the policies were to be enacted by teachers, an uneasy 
interconnection was found in the desire for measurement of success and these professional 
efforts. As has often occurred with education reforms, the benchmark was the floor. How 
many students moved from below standard to reach the desired level measured the success of 
the policy. Teachers were granted the flexibility of ‘tailoring teaching to individual children’s 
needs.’92 The importance of teachers’ work in achieving political objectives may explain the 
less aggressive tone in Schools Achieving Success as compared to previous policy documents. 
The Government demonstrated sympathy for the challenges faced by educators, such as 
teachers’ workload. Understanding morphed into a profound statement: ‘We are clear that 
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teaching must be, and feel, a manageable job as well as a valued and important profession.’93 
This new attitude constituted a change in tactic, but with the same aim of cajoling teachers to 
ameliorate their performance. 
 
In this context arose the 2003 framework agreement amongst the Government, the employers’ 
association (the National Employers’ Organisation for School Teachers (NEOST)) and 
teachers’ unions (except for the strident National Union of Teachers)94 which outlined the 
mutual aspirations of the parties and set a floor of expectations.95 The agreement’s dual focus 
was to improve students’ achievement by the reduction of teachers’ workloads.96  The parties 
based their discussion on the report by Price Waterhouse Coopers which outlined significant 
workload burdens on teachers and the negative impact this had on actual teaching.97 
Reformulating teacher contracts was one of the primary means of meeting this undertaking. 
The language employed signified an attempt to bring accord to burgeoning discord. The 
contractual changes for teachers singled out administrative and clerical tasks as the ones to be 
removed from teachers’ work.98 As of 2003, teachers were not to be ‘required to undertake 
formal aspects of the line-management of support staff.’99 The National Agreement also 
returned to the issues of coverage for absent teachers and preparation time which were 
litigated in the 1980s. Coverage was to be reduced starting at 38 hours per year; ‘but it should 
be unusual for most teachers to provide such a high amount of cover.’100 Preparation time of 
any teacher who provided cover for an absent colleague was protected. Planning, preparation 
and assessment time (PPA) would minimally be 10% of a teacher’s normal timetabled 
teaching time (1265 hours per year).101 A distinct pedagogical philosophy took shape here and 
its motto was: ‘There will be no progress if PPA time simply shifts other work into evenings 
and weekends.’102 Managing staff within their new entitlements became an essential part of 
this system of administration. 
 
Despite the invitation to discourse, the Government did not completely depart from past 
actions.103 Towards the end of Blair’s time in office, the Government’s trust in teachers 
remained minimal. In 2006, it produced The Education (School Teacher Performance 
Management) (England) Regulations 2006104 which required school governing bodies to 
‘establish a written policy (‘the performance management policy’) setting out how the 
performance of teachers at the school [was] to be managed and reviewed’.105 The results 
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would then be used to determine pay progression.106 The mandatory elements of the policy 
included an outline of the intended achievements and how success would be measured. Each 
teacher’s performance was then to be reviewed at the end of the outlined cycle and measured 
against the performance criteria. The framework in essence added another layer of oversight 
to an already dense area. It is a worthwhile consideration that even within the United 
Kingdom the method utilised in England was not adopted elsewhere.  
 
Blair’s strategy for education in England contrasted with the much more collegial form 
employed in Wales. Following the devolution of powers,107 efficiency was to be found in 
‘collegial working’.108 The difference in strategy was also accompanied by a difference in 
vision: while Blair had a clear plan, there was no blueprint in Wales for achieving 
efficiencies.109 In Wales a much more local approach was employed whereas in England, 
centralisation of decision-making for education meant that local control had deteriorated 
significantly. As managers of teachers, the Welsh government was much less critical and 
viewed teachers as people ‘to be trusted, to be listened to and to be respected rather than 
criticised and ‘“shamed” as in some English educational policy discourse.’110 A troubling fact 
for the Welsh was that they ranked last of the four United Kingdom jurisdictions according to 
the 2007 PISA report.111 A direct correlation between management of teachers and low 
scoring is not possible based on this survey. The difference could be attributed to the ad hoc 
manner of determining improvements. It could also be attributed to the lack of a comparable 
funding infusion for Welsh education as in England.112 Still, there is a contrast between the 
choice of management styles in each jurisdiction with each believing a differing manner 
would be best suited to the locale.  
 
Another contrast is the framework agreement reached in Scotland. There, a local and national 
collective bargaining framework was entrenched.113 Since 1980 there had been the Scottish 
Joint Negotiating Committee for School Education, established under section 91 of the Edu-
cation (Scotland) Act 1980.114 This Committee was abolished by section 5 of the Standards in 
Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000115 and replaced in 2001 by the Scottish Negotiating Com-
mittee for Teachers (a tripartite body composed of teachers’ organisations, local authorities 
and the Scottish Government) established under article 5 of the framework agreement entitled 
A Teaching Profession for the 21st Century. These developments arose from the report of the 
Independent Committee of Inquiry into Professional Conditions of Service of Teachers.116 
Similar to the method employed in Wales, the Scottish Government has been keen on an in-
clusive relationship with its teachers than the more prescriptive one found in England.  
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In each of the Thatcher, Major and Blair eras, English reforms acknowledged the underlying 
premise that management of the teacher workforce and policy were inextricably linked in 
publicly-funded education. And yet, teachers’ work defied the mechanistic means employed 
because they were the ones who translated the policies for individual students. Education 
reform depended on teachers because there were so many variables with teaching students 
and this point seemed to have been overlooked all along. This is not a statement suggesting 
teachers’ victimisation. Rather it conveys an observation: teachers are pivotal in education 
success and yet no level of prescription can guarantee ‘good teaching’ or greater teacher 
achievement with students.  
 
VI. Canada and England: Historical symmetry, contemporary divergence  
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the English model described to this point 
has been followed (unwittingly or otherwise) in Canada. There are two premises for this 
comparison. First, there is an intriguing symmetry in the evolution of education management 
in both jurisdictions, suggesting a commonality transcending geography. Second, the recent 
bold steps taken in England have departed from the shared sequence of events, but may 
foreshadow future events as the country continues along a period of restraint with increased 
quality demands. 
 
The comparison between these two jurisdictions is apt because of the historical symmetry 
between the locales. The Canadian province of Ontario has been selected for two reasons. 
First, Canadian law separates powers between federal and provincial governments. As a result 
of the Constitution Act 1867, education has been made a matter of provincial jurisdiction. 
And so, there is no national level of regulation and oversight in Canada. Second, Ontario has 
been selected because of its close parallels with events in England since the late 1970s. As 
outlined below, events (until 2010) have unfolded in a similar manner, despite a separation of 
about fifteen years between the two trends. In late 1970s England and early 1990s Ontario, a 
government of a more socialist ethos ((what now might be called ‘Old’) Labour in England 
and the New Democratic Party in Ontario) sought to control public sector salaries by way of a 
‘social contract’ which resulted (after a few years in England and almost immediately in 
Ontario) in massive unrest amongst the public sector unions. It is contended that these unions’ 
boisterous reactions against social contracts established a notorious legacy for public sector 
unions which extends to the present day. Since that time, governments have been either 
outwardly hostile or very cautious towards this group. Immediately after the fervent 
opposition to the social contract, a Conservative government was elected (1979 in England 
and 1995 in Ontario). These governments quickly started upon centralising control of 
education, thereby reconstituting management of the system. Teachers (and their unions) were 
castigated by the presiding governments for delaying improvements and teachers retorted in 
kind. In each jurisdiction, Conservative governments made choices in how to deal with the 
challenges. Responding to the loss of faith in English schools during the mid-to-late 1970s, 
the Thatcher Government took aim at teachers’ unions (for example by removing collective 
bargaining rights in 1987). The Conservatives in Ontario (1995 to the early 2000s) presided 
over a similarly labour-hostile period (though there was no removal of collective bargaining 
rights). A key difference between England and Ontario was the absence of a similar crisis. 
Ontario’s government took over direct control of the portfolio in order to reduce education 
spending. Putting aside any distinctions as to motivation, both governments seized the 
political opportunity and reforms were given effect via the legal framework. Both 
Conservative parties centralised power in government’s hands, thereby diminishing (some 
may say neutering) local control. Strong policies aimed at the (perceived) poor work of 
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teachers also characterised this tense period. Teacher accountability was said to be increased 
while incomes (in the public sector overall) were subject to policies curbing rises.  
 
After years of conflict, a new, less confrontational government was elected (an ostensibly 
more liberal government – though not like those which brought in the ‘social contract’ – 
being (most recently called ‘New’) Labour in England in 1997 and Liberal in Ontario in 
2003. A more cooperative era emerged, but also one in which teachers’ unions appeared 
unsure of their paths.117  Although these new governments brought hope of cessation to labour 
strife coupled with a promise of persistent efforts to raise standards in schools, neither 
dramatically dismantled its predecessors’ reforms. Instead, management of education 
remained centralised; the most obvious change being procedural as some more earnest efforts 
at dialogue were made.  
 
2008 stood out as a year of important change in Ontario. This was the year in which the 
Provincial Government cemented the use of framework agreements (in Ontario it would be 
referred to as provincial collective bargaining) as it brought school boards and teachers’ 
unions together to agree to a framework. 2008 was the year in which collective agreements 
from the Liberal Government’s first term in office expired. The 2004 effort was heavily 
criticised by school board organisations for imposing terms on them (the allegation being that 
the first framework agreement was reached between the government and the teachers’ 
unions). Although provincial bargaining of sorts was employed in 2004, that effort is distinct 
from the 2008 form. Intent on forming consensus from all parties, the government’s 2008 
attempt brought all provincial organisations together to create a common framework. This 
agreement outlined the overarching terms and conditions between teachers and school boards. 
Unlike the same effort in England in 2003, this agreement contained great detail and was to 
form the template for all local level collective agreements reached throughout the province.118 
The 2008 agreement solidified the central position of government as both purser and 
facilitator but, most importantly, the government was the lead in achieving the result.  
 
A comparison of each jurisdiction’s education management also features dissimilarities. Per-
haps the most obvious difference is the tolerance of trade unionism, where Ontario offers a 
relatively friendly locale as compared to England. Recent court decisions illustrate the dis-
tinction. The 2007 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada recognised a right to collective 
bargaining for unionised employees.119 Prior to that, secondary picketing had been constitu-
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tionally protected pursuant to workers’ rights to freedom of expression.120 In contrast, the 
2009 English Court of Appeal in Metrobus Ltd. v UNITE characterised the ‘right’ to strike as 
little ‘more than a slogan or a legal metaphor.’121 This quotation typifies a far more narrow 
conception of labour rights in English courts than that commonly found in Canadian judicial 
decisions.122 Furthermore, unlike their Ontario counterparts, English trade unions must meet a 
series of imposing obligations which appear designed to frustrate collective action as opposed 
to ensuring member support for such activity.123  
 
The notion of partnership124 also points up a difference between the two jurisdictions where 
Ontario appears to be leaning more towards greater input from teachers (by way of negotiat-
ed, detailed framework agreements) as compared to the continued itemisation of work obliga-
tions in England. In neither instance, however, is partnership an operation of equals. Rather 
what is called partnership is an exercise of government power so that government retains 
overarching authority, but permits the other parties to participate in finding solutions.  
 
Other Canadian provinces have experienced difficulties with the management of education. 
Similar to Ontario, labour law has been the backdrop for debate in British Columbia 
(Canada’s western-most province). The Public Education Labour Relations Act125 gives the 
impression that there are many bargaining agents, however, there are only two: for the 
employer, the British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association and for teachers, the 
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF). The early part of the 21st century has been a 
time of extensive labour unrest in the province as the Government terminated all public sector 
collective agreements. This act was challenged in the courts and came to a conclusion with 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Health Services and Support – Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia.126 The Supreme Court ruled that the 
government had violated health sector workers’ collective bargaining rights by failing to 
make any effort to dialogue with the relevant unions. As the Health Services case moved up 
the court system, the BCTF took strike action in 2005. The ability of government to alter the 
parameters of bargaining (in this case by declaring teachers to be essential service providers) 
significantly changed the collective bargaining landscape; in essence unilaterally changing the 
collective agreement. In a move similar to that of the Conservatives in Ontario, the 
government also claimed that monies were not readily available to put into the education 
system. BCTF’s strike action was ruled ‘illegal’ and it was found in contempt of court.127 The 
British Columbia Government’s use of the tools available revealed the contemporary 
pressures of fiscal management of public services in a globalised era. The two examples of 
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British Columbia and Ontario evidence a shift promulgated by economic pressures to reduce 
public service costs. 
 
Anticipating the final section of this article, the comparison between England and Ontario 
highlights the significance of the Coalition Government’s reforms of education law. It is a 
monumental shift in the structuring of education regulation. Moreover, the Coalition’s plan 
stands out as a model for education governance responding directly to the financial 
constraints stemming from the economic crisis of 2008. 
 
VII. Investing in local control  
2010 was the first year of the Coalition Government mandate; a partnership between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. For education, it was a monumental time because 
the Coalition put forward its new schools plan, which actively promoted academies and 
initiated the idea of free schools. Their agenda extended an intriguing lineage in the 
management of education. The theme of individual responsibility advocated by Labour’s 
Third Way sees its successor in the Coalition’s plan. The Third Way stressed that ‘individuals 
should take primary responsibility for themselves and their children.’128 More than Labour, 
current Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ relies on communities volunteering to 
direct their local schools. It recalled the efforts under John Major to distance government 
from direct, day-to-day control over education. As noted, Blair engaged with this to some 
extent. It would be inaccurate, however, to describe the Coalition plan simply as the next step 
in a sequence of methods for education management because the unequivocal advocacy of 
academies and free schools is monumental.  
 
The decision to take this next step remains a fundamental shift. Access to quality, non-
specialised education is put in question by this plan: will these reforms suitably pave the way 
for improved education and positive social change. Regulating for local control emerged as a 
significant part of the Coalition’s overall method of governance. Aside from education, it can 
be viewed in employment regulation where the Coalition has brought in many reforms (for 
example under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013). These changes have been 
particularly directed at the small to medium sized businesses (SMEs)129 (a significant part of 
private sector employment).130  
 
Though it is outside the focus of this piece, the Coalition Government’s actions on Higher 
Education should be briefly noted for their contrast with its management of primary and 
secondary matters. Looking at the Coalition's plans as a complete body of education reforms, 
one is struck by the extensive work undertaken by this Government. It is no small feat to 
restructure education at all levels simultaneously. This bold agenda discloses an intriguing 
perspective on education in which primary and secondary education are both matters of local 
interest but Higher Education is one requiring national regulation. The PISA 2012- Country 
Note on the UK found that forty-three percent of 35-44 year old individuals have a tertiary 
level qualification which is well above the OECD average of thirty-four percent.131 The 
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Browne Report132 set out reasons for emphasising Higher Education based on financial 
evidence. If there was vocabulary to absorb from the report it was ‘outputs’. The attempts to 
regulate tuition fees in Higher Education indicated the Coalition believed it could generate 
greater output potential in higher education.133 Early on there is a contrapuntal movement: 
while decentralisation headlines the focus for primary and secondary schools, efforts to more 
centrally control Higher Education have developed since the Coalition came to power. 
 
(i) A new school system 
Based on comments in the White Paper, The Importance of Teaching,134 the Coalition’s main 
focus has been on reducing the bureaucracy built-up through the preceding years of education 
regulation; though goal-oriented phrases regarding student achievement like ‘chronic, 
ingrained educational failure’ persist in speeches.135 The Importance of Teaching outlined 
plans to reduce much of the regulation developed since Thatcher and up to Labour’s election 
defeat in 2010: ‘the National Curriculum includes too much that is not essential knowledge, 
and there is too much prescription about how to teach.’136 Underlying this message was the 
informing ethos that not only will the level of centralised direction be reduced but so too will 
the role of government in order to ‘allow schools to decide how to teach while refocusing on 
the core subject knowledge that every child and young person should gain at each stage of 
their education.’137 Though autonomy constitutes the aim, the thinking behind The 
Importance of Teaching discloses a different meaning: through autonomy138 the ‘best 
performing and fastest improving education systems in the world show us what is 
possible.’139 Here there are distinct echoes of so-called ‘Third Way’ thought which influenced 
Blair’s Labour.140 
 
The Coalition’s plans (and one of two options it has put forward) have focused on academies. 
Not a new idea, academies were introduced by the Labour Government in 2000 and carried 
forward in 2002;141 a point admitted by the Secretary of State for Education.142 Two hundred 
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and two schools had been granted this status under Labour. To reinforce the decision to 
pursue academies in such a vigorous manner, the current government has even taken to 
recalling the origins of academies by quoting from former Prime Minister Blair’s 
autobiography.143 According to the Department of Education (formed in 2010), academies 
provide ‘freedom’. The Academies Act 2010 contained benefits for those schools ‘converting’ 
into an academy:  freedom from local authority control  ability to set your own pay and conditions for staff  freedom from following the National Curriculum  ability to change the lengths of terms and school days.144 
 
These pillars summarised a plan for monumental change. The Department also identified a 
shift from central – a dynamic since the installation of the National Curriculum – to local con-
trol: decisions regarding how teachers will conduct their work will now be made at the local 
level rather than central government. As of December 2011, the Department of Education es-
timated close to 1000 academies had opened since September 2010.145 As of December 2012, 
there were 2543 open academies (with more schools expected to convert to academy status in 
2013).146 Figures published in January 2014 found 3613 academies open in England with 
2509 of these being ‘converter academies’ (the Government’s term to distinguish academies 
opened under the Academies Act 2010 from those opened before its coming into force).147 
Academies have become the desired route for schools.148  
 
Oversight: this is one way to characterise the shift endorsed by the Coalition Government. 
Instead of a national government, the local community will take on the role of supervising 
teachers directly and managing the finances of the school. The plan is about autonomy; 
empowering communities to seek out desired results in the ways they see fit. Management of 
academies is undertaken through the power of sponsors who oversee the school. Sponsors 
delegate the day-to-day running of the institution to a board of governors who are charged 
with administration of staffing issues. Though hinted at already, the Coalition Government’s 
proposals are proximate to grant maintained schools (initiated by the Education Reform Act 
1988) which also received money directly from government. Of note, the Local Management 
System of Schools (LMS) created by the 1988 Act proved to be useful for current plans. The 
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LMS established a per capita weighted formula for school funding149 and this framework has 
made it simpler for schools to be funded either through a Local Authority or centrally from 
the Department of Education. For the Coalition Government, those who have a direct interest 
in the outcome will be best placed to create success. This leads to a simple strategy: if the 
public school system is not achieving the results of an academy, the public school will be 
compelled to better itself. 
 
An early assessment of academies has been positive, but it predictably also raises some 
questions. Machin and Veniot studied the conversion of schools into academies, measuring 
the impact of the change on pupil intake and pupil performance during a period beginning in 
the 2001/02 school year and ending in 2008/09. The authors identified an immediate increase 
in the ‘quality’ of the students the academy accepted.150 It may be wondered if this 
improvement is the result of an academy having control over intake and being in a position to 
select or reject certain types of students. Only 10% of the intake, however, may be selected in 
this manner. Pupil performance also increased, but the upward trend is limited to the first 
cohort entering the academy.151 This study affirmed conversion to an academy and yet 
suggested that sustained improvement will remain an area of continual focus. The authors 
concluded:  
we also find that it is possible for neighbouring schools to experience significant improvements in 
their pupil performance despite the reduction in the ‘quality’ of their pupil intake. This seems to 
occur (mainly) in the neighbours of academy schools that experience large significant improvements 
in their pupil performance. We do not believe that this is a coincidence: it suggests that it is possible 
for performance improvements in an academy to generate significant beneficial external effects on 
their neighbouring schools.152  
 
This offshoot effect is a desired outcome for the Coalition Government. Again, though, 
continued amelioration may need constant stimulus. Sustaining positive effects of conversion 
to an academy remain in question.  
 
Performance of converter academies153 contains the Department of Education’s analysis of 
inspections of academies as compared to schools still under local authority direction based on 
Ofsted inspections. The conclusion of this report that achievement in converter academies ‘is, 
on average, higher than that in local authority mainstream schools, reflecting their origin as 
predominantly higher performing schools (since high performers were eligible to convert 
earliest)’154 is a statement requiring unpacking. Consistently, primary and secondary 
converter schools show greater improvement than their local authority comparators. Referring 
back to the last phrase of the above quotation, this study takes into consideration what would 
likely be the highest performing grouping of schools converting to academy status. And so, it 
brings into question whether a part of this analysis is a bit of a shell argument. For example, 
nineteen of the fifty-seven converter academies (33%) which had been previously rated as 
outstanding maintained that rating as compared to twenty-five percent of local authority 
schools falling into the same category.155 The difference between the two groupings falls 
short of evidencing a monumental shift when one considers that the schools in the converter 
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academy group were the best-performing. The point here is not to deny improvement, but to 
raise attention to the fact that these statistics are supposed to reinforce a shift from local 
authority control to academy status. Machin and Veniot’s research, furthermore, predicted an 
immediate increase in achievement. The question remains whether increases or outstanding 
status can be maintained. Performance of converter academies shows improvements as 
compared to local authority schools. It also demonstrates that conversion to this status does 
not guarantee ameliorated levels of achievement.  
 
There is some early indication that where academies are falling below standards the 
Department for Education will intervene. The extent of this intervention, given the early stage 
of academies, continues to unfold. Since 8th November 2013, the Department for Education 
has issued pre-warning letters to 40 academies. In these letters, the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State for Schools, Lord Nash, outlined the Department’s authority (which is 
specified in the relevant academy’s articles of association) to intervene in the school based on 
‘unacceptably low’ standards of performance (specific indications of this characterization, 
including reference to the relevant Ofsted report, are provided to each school). The pre-
warning letter’s purpose was to alert the administration of the academy in question to official 
notice being taken of poor results and to require the school to improve its education 
standards. Schools are then given fifteen days to respond with its plan of action. Since 8th 
November 2013, three warning notices have been delivered. These are the next stage of 
intervention by the Department for Education. These letters are sent out, it seems, as a last 
resort before the Secretary of State exercises his authority to appoint additional directors to 
improve the academy’s work (which the letter warns could be the next step taken).  
 
A continuation from previous strategies, The absence of a formative role for teachers within 
these reforms continues to display distrust of teachers. Though questions would likely arise in 
the consultation process for establishing an academy as set out in s.5 of the Act, there was no 
explicit obligation in the Act requiring local communities to consult school staff other than to 
‘consult such persons as they [thought] appropriate.’156 The scope of the consultation defined 
by the Act focussed solely on ‘the question of whether the school should be converted into an 
Academy’. Clearly there were further questions. The Education Act 2011 contained an 
amendment to the Academies Act 2010 which provided for the transfer of ‘rights and liabili-
ties (including rights and liabilities in relation to staff) of the local authority or the governing 
body which were acquired or incurred for the purposes of the school.’157 Statements by the 
Secretary for Education indicate that academies offer better remuneration for teachers,158 but 
evidence is not readily discernible.  
 
The second option is free schools.159 The Department of Education defined free schools (the 
second component of reforms) as ‘independent state schools run by teachers not bureaucrats 
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or politicians and accountable to parents.’160 The plan does not exclude other groups such as 
parents or charities.161 If a school opted for the free school (or academy) route, funding would 
come directly from the government and not the government via the local authority. Once the 
option was selected, there seems to be no opportunity to opt back into local authority 
control.162 Steeped in concerns over the social fabric, however, English teachers’ unions have 
contended that free schools will only deepen already existing disparities between affluent and 
underprivileged communities.163 In 2014, much attention was drawn to the Al-Madinah free 
school for its poor quality of secondary level education. As of September 2014, secondary 
students at this school have been enrolled in schools other than Al-Madinah. The reason for 
the Department of Education’s decision was: ‘the poor quality of secondary teaching and the 
lack of breadth in secondary curriculum.’164 Primary level education will continue. At present, 
academies are far more popular than free schools and so it would seem that the latter will 
constitute a minority of the selected new schooling options.  
 
(ii) Abandoning centralised for local control: a model for a globalised world? 
Set against the background of globalisation, the need in education has become more 
prominent but also more difficult to provide. The questions raised in the previous section 
regarding local control are intended to highlight the significance of the changes promulgated 
by the Coalition Government. The wholesale abandonment of centralised control absence 
clear evidence of failure is noteworthy. There is no middle step evident. The government has 
attempted to download much of the responsibility for schools directly onto local 
communities, asking them to become direct stakeholders. This is likely to result in increased 
expectations regarding the work of teachers in that they will be called upon to bridge the gaps 
created. It may be said that the Coalition is returning education to the days of more localised 
control. While this may be, the 21st century presents vastly different challenges from those of 
1944 in relation to education.  
 
The reforms compel consideration of access to a full curriculum public education. Earlier in 
this piece, it was contended that in the Thatcher era teachers’ work was regulated as a means 
of raising the quality of teaching while simultaneously trying to constrain expenditure. After 
Blair’s Labour came to power, this method was continued insofar as the regulation of teachers 
was intensified.165 At that time, government was open to spending more in order to improve 
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the quality of education. With the Coalition, the same aims have been maintained as in the 
Thatcher era and indeed teachers’ work remains a focus of reform. Use of academies and free 
schools, with their emphasis on direct local control, is a variation of cajoling: with constant 
oversight at the school level, so the thinking appears to be, teachers will perform better and 
student scores will increase.  
 
As a response to globalisation, the Coalition Government plan evidences a truth: globalisation 
increases the demand for social spending, but simultaneously decreases the means by which 
government may meet this call. The management of English public education has been and 
continues to be through a legislated policy of control and cajole. The policy started to develop 
in the 1960s when English governments became increasingly concerned with expenditure in 
the education portfolio. By the 1970s, the management of education had started to intensify 
with a greater focus on what occurred in the classroom: what was being taught and how 
effective such instruction had been.166 These dual concerns were focal points for the 
education reforms of the government in the 1980s (the Conservatives led by Margaret 
Thatcher) who implemented a unitary vision of education. Consolidation of control became 
the means of realising this singular vision. This mode reached its height under the Blair 
Labour Government. Labour believed in putting money into education to improve results but 
would not rely on education personnel to achieve this aim. By the early part of the 21st 
century a new path has been charted. For the most part, government has been singular in its 
management of English education since the 1980s: following one model without reserve;167 a 
method repeated by the Coalition Government. Now, market and society have been melded 
together. While the creativity theoretically found in entrepreneurial activity remains an ideal 
to which we may strive, the present plan pits communities against each other, thereby 
undercutting the social cooperation necessary to bring about desired results.  
 
The Coalition’s plan also presents the opportunity for government to constrain expenditure by 
outsourcing the day-to-day control of education. According to PISA 2012 – Country Note on 
the UK, the jurisdiction spends approximately $98,032 (USD) per student between six and 
fifteen years old where the OECD average is $83,382 (USD).168 It is argued that the present 
reforms constitute a first step towards capping money available for education; continuing a 
trend of increasing the role of the market and correspondingly reducing that of the state with 
the effect of decreasing government spending. The Coalition Government’s decisive action 
represents a means of addressing expenditure and quality issues where the slogan ‘Big 
Society’ is instructive. Instead of prescription, the government believes handing control to 
local communities (not local authorities) who volunteer to do so will achieve better results. 
Reform in this manner achieves two key goals for the Coalition. Government may step out of 
direct control of local education and focus its role on oversight. It may also provides a means 
by which government may constrain public expenditure on education. The implications for 
access to a full curriculum education begin here: legal reform is forcing a discussion and 
defining its parameters. This is the first step towards a debate regarding funding in education 
centring on a segregation of items into two categories: areas which government will fund and 
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programmes outside of that classification to be otherwise funded. The Coalition reforms 
query the interaction between education as a service (and therefore freely offered by any 
individual or group) and as a matter managed by the state.  
 
The Coalition plan departs from the Thatcher legacy of education governance; a break which 
appears to date back to the creation of the Education Reform Act 1988. In an interview with 
Chitty, Stuart Sexton (one of the architects of the Act) contended that the National Curriculum 
diverted attention away from the important part of the legislation which was grant-maintained 
schools. Anticipating the Coalition Government, Sexton advanced a secondary role for 
curriculum in education reform: ‘the curriculum should be one of the school’s selling-points 
with its own particular consumer … Schools should be able to respond to what they perceive 
the market is looking for.’169 It is posited that the current plans for education have returned to 
the underlying proposition in 1988 of specialisation through meeting market needs. Moreover, 
a by-product of consistent reforms has been the critical questions regarding the content and 
method of teachers’ work.170 The accumulation of negative commentary has taken a toll on 
the standing of teachers as autonomous professionals. Underlying the commentary here is the 
fact that confidence in teachers and the system in general has fallen to a perilous level; 
reaching a point when desire to reform outstrips the patience required to properly assess the 
effect of recently implemented changes. With the Coalition’s desire to move away from 
central control, teachers’ work remains under scrutiny. The difference now will likely be 
much more individualised prescription of teachers’ work at the local level. 
 
Further questions which touch on the topic of local control arise. For example, will these 
institutions compete for the services of the ‘best graduates’171 or others considered highly 
proficient in teaching? There could only be a modest market for such teachers because under 
any system there would be a finite amount of money allowed for school expenditure; unless a 
school had the capacity to raise further funds.172 It may be wondered if schools were to 
assume the management of teachers’ pension plans. This in itself would be a significant 
undertaking and one which may well be beyond the capacity of a local community. A further 
query is whether there is a succession plan regarding school leadership. The Importance of 
Teaching called on the local community to lead these schools and this raises the point of 
continuity. Reforms’ continued success relies heavily on local support; likely from those 
parents whose children attend the school. Once a parent’s child left the school would that 
parent continue on in a leadership role? It may be conjectured that teachers will naturally take 
leadership roles. The White Paper suggested this – ‘the most important factor in determining 
the effectiveness of a school system is the quality of its teachers.’173 However, The 
Importance of Teaching and the aforementioned legislation indicate that teachers are more 
likely to be viewed as the staff which will carry out directions provided by the local 
community. Despite these questions, the movement to academies has been profound.  
 
Another means of critically viewing these plans is to ask: to where does this freedom lead? 
The free school and academy options recall a theme evident throughout the period under 
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study: competition in education will improve results dramatically. Competition density, 
though, will increase as the number of individually governed schools rises. This is autonomy 
as defined by the market for education. To adapt to the market of education, schools will 
recognise the benefit of specialising in some manner in order to maintain a consistent flow of 
students.174 As a result of competition, the freedom to run a school without regard to 
specialisation can be hampered.175 This would also put into question the viability of 
comprehensive schools since these institutions are ranked according to a broader range of 
criteria.176 Freedom carries the potential for diverse schooling experiences, but it necessitates 
consideration of whether or not there will be a standard base of learning amongst graduates of 
these schools. Freedom in fact rests with the school to target a market. This can be quite 
different from providing quality education.   
 
The PISA 2012 report supports the idea of competition: ‘the competition for schools creates 
incentives for institutions to organize programmes and teaching in ways that better meet 
diverse student requirements and interests, thus reducing the cost of failure and 
mismatches.’177 There is an important pre-condition in this report: ‘On the premise that 
students and parents have adequate information and choose schools based on academic 
criteria or programme quality’.178 The Coalition plan of academies precipitates a level of 
specialization which does not happily coincide with the consideration outlined in the 
quotation. The difficulty is that school competition (and the corollary of school selection) is a 
multi-faceted concept, affected by such factors as ‘local school markets, school performance, 
affordability, capacity and enrolment patterns.’179 The single indicator of competitiveness 
which informs the Coalition education reforms overlooks that parental choice is not itself a 
singular consideration: ‘in nine of the [participating countries] over 50% of parents reported 
that a safe school environment is a very important criterion when choosing a school for their 
child. In four [of the participating countries], over 50% of parents reported that a school’s 
good reputation is a very important criterion for choosing a school for their child.’ 
Furthermore, this package of reforms requires an activist community to become involved. 
OECD figures (as reported by school principals) indicate that parents need teachers’ 
prompting to be involved in childrens’ schooling.180 Academies, as one example, require 
those with initiative.  
 
If PISA is increasingly relied upon as a measurement, localisation situates individual schools 
within a more international market. Local communities have been invited to establish 
academies or free schools with the chance of creating their school; deviation from the 
National Curriculum stands out as one example of the freedom presented by the opportunity. 
There are more profound challenges nonetheless. Specialisation in itself limits access to a 
comprehensive curriculum. A highly localised plan of study may dubiously serve immediate 
desires for education because it often differs across the country. The National Curriculum in 
1988 (the matter eschewed by Sexton above) established a benchmark of achievement for 
each student regardless of locale. The lack of a student benchmark would strain the regulatory 
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authority of the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) to assess these schools.181 How 
can assessments be made regarding: ‘how far the education provided in the school meets the 
needs of the range of pupils at the school’; the school’s education standards; and whether 
financial resources are managed effectively?182 The current plan has the potential for a return 
to the fragmentation in learning of just a few decades ago without further guidance regarding 
common standards to be met.  
 
Given the significance of the move to local control, there are a surprising number of 
uncertainties which remain. Downloading responsibility for education to local communities is 
a bold decision for England where there has been a strong history of government management 
of such a large portfolio. There is great potential for significant negative repercussions. 
Education comes at a cost and this fact should not militate against government involvement in 
the area. The cost will consistently fluctuate. Under the proposed new system, a perennial 
lack of certainty can emerge and from these initial cracks daunting challenges can fill the 
expanse created.   
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The history of the management of education through this period has been highlighted by 
significant and relatively rapid reforms: from the mid-1970s through the centralised control of 
the Thatcher era to the intensive and detailed regulation of teachers’ work in the Blair Labour 
years to the present when one history ceased and another era has begun. The aim has been to 
outline the English example for the purpose of demonstrating the bold step recently taken in 
the former jurisdiction. A comparison with Canada demonstrates not only symmetry between 
the two jurisdictions but may also suggest a path to be adopted in that country. Beyond 
Canada, recent events in England may be of benefit as case studies in legislative management 
of education. 
 
The Coalition plans break from the consolidated management of education administered by 
its predecessors. Both methods seek cost certainty and improved work from teachers, but the 
Coalition’s proposal is more idea than reform. Through the idea of freedom, communities are 
invited to run their schools. This shift places the local community at the forefront of education 
change. Little is known about how this new method will be undertaken; as it stands localised 
control without centralised aims beyond expenditure restraint and compelling better results 
from teaching personnel. Whether the desired results will be achieved remains unclear; what 
is more apparent is this is a means to displace government’s central role in the portfolio. In so 
doing, access to a full curriculum education has become a marketing strategy as opposed to 
the aim of all schools  
 
The basis of the Coalition plan should be viewed as a means towards limiting expenditure. 
One must query whether this is a suitable premise considering a longer-term projection of this 
agenda. Once local control is established there is an opportunity to slowly siphon off 
percentage points of public money from these schools. These reforms signal a movement 
towards needs only government funding. Under the rubric of ‘Big Society’, government has 
ostensibly invited the public to become directly involved in a matter which was long held to 
be largely the domain of government; with the exception of private schools which always 
operated in a distinct realm. Although government will provide money to these academies and 
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free schools, the question will be how much. As has been mentioned by different 
governments, the costs of education continue to rise. Establishing academies and free schools 
will not curb that rise but it provides a means for government to limit education-related 
expenditures. At this fledgling stage, the expansion of local community control of schools 
initiates a debate about what are the standard items expected to be provided by schools and 
which are electives. ‘Big Society’ would be the inverse of ‘Big Government’: society will 
absorb more of the costs of what were previously exclusively public sector services. ‘Big 
Society’ represents the next generation of restraint in education expenditure. There is a direct 
correlation between the shrinking role of government and the increasing part for the 
community. Government becomes a more distant overseer of education, essentially funding 
education in a capped-expenditure system. The options for future governments in relation to 
managing public sector spending in education open up under this system. For example, the 
circumstance may be that government will fund so-called standard parts of education and the 
local community will be required to fund elective services (or some percentage of the overall 
cost). Another form of restraint may come in the form of capping certain parts of the delivery 
of education: the government may decide that it will fund a standard average teachers’ salary 
at a rate which itself would necessitate reductions in staffing.   
  
 
